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THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT:
A CONTINUING EXPERIMENT IN
SPECIALIZATION
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfusst
In 1987, when the Federal Circuit was five years old, I con-
ducted a study of its administration of patent law. The article
I wrote was gratifyingly well received, and many people sug-
gested that I reexamine the work of the court on the occasion
of its twentieth anniversary. Unfortunately, the methodology
that I adopted the first time out could no longer be utilized.
At the time, there were so few patent cases published that I
could read each one and analyze it both procedurally and
substantively. Now, the number of cases is too large to make
that tactic feasible. The time period is four times longer;
patent filings and issuances have grown; more disputes are
litigated; and the Federal Circuit has added new judgeships.
This study of the Federal Circuit therefore relies on secon-
dary sources and anecdotal materials. I have, however, had
the great benefit of consulting with the Federal Trade Com-
mission on its Hearings on Competition and Intellectual
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy
and serving as a member of the National Academy of Sci-
ence's Committee on Intellectual Property in the Knowledge-
Based Economy. These positions have given me the opportu-
nity to listen to people who have studied the patent system
from a wide variety of perspectives. The following is what I
have learned.
t Pauline Newman Professor of Law, NYU School of Law. I would like to thank Kim-
berly Moore and Mark Lemley for their insightful comments on an earlier draft and Amy Pow-
ell, NYU Class of 2004, for her superb research.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
Students of judicial administration have long debated the use
of specialization to improve the quality of adjudication. On the
positive side, channeling cases to a single court reduces opportuni-
ties for forum shopping. Further, specialization can foster exper-
tise, leading to more accurate and efficient decisionmaking. But
there are also negative aspects. It has been argued that exclusive
focus on particular areas of law, when coupled with a lack of inter-
change with other courts, may engender bias in favor of particular
views, tunnel vision, unique (and possibly inferior) practices, and
law that departs from mainstream trends. In 1982, the opportunity
to observe these possibilities arose. In that year, Congress special-
ized the adjudication of patent disputes by channeling patent ap-
peals to a single court-the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit.I
The Federal Circuit is not specialized in the traditional sense.
Its docket includes areas outside the field of patent law.2  More-
over, by virtue of the well-pleaded complaint rule, state courts and
regional courts retain residual authority over patent disputes.
3
Nonetheless, those who study the patent portion of the court's
docket, or practice patent law before the court, have seen both the
benefits and detriments of specialization emerge during the court's
two decades of existence. Practitioners appear to be in general
agreement that centralizing patent appeals in a single court is a
vast improvement over regional adjudication.4 Although there
were suspicions of a pro-patentee bias in the court's early years,
these have largely abated And while forum shopping for particu-
' See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Special-
ized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit] (studying
the court's first years and proposing adjustments); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adju-
dication, 1990 BYU L. REv. 377 [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication] (discussing
the advantages and disadvantages of specialized courts).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000) (providing for jurisdiction over appeals of regional adjudica-
tion of all patent disputes and certain tort cases brought against the United States; of decisions
of the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of International Trade; of certain decisions of the
International Trade Commission; of decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board; of dispute
resolution under the Contract Disputes Act and various economic measures, including the Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act, the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, the National Gas Policy Act,
and the Energy Policy Conservation Act; and of certain agency action under the Federal Labor
Relations Authority, the Patent Act, and the Lanham (Trademark) Act).
3 See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002),
which is discussed below; see, e.g., Telcomm Technical Servs., Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Commu-
nications, Inc., 295 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (transferring the appeal of an antitrust case with
patent law counterclaim to the Eleventh Circuit). See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, "Aris-
ing Under" Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 253
(2003) (discussing the retention of residual authority).
4 Carl Tobias, The White Commission and the Federal Circuit, 10 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 45, 58 (2000) (citing the Comm'n on Structural Alternatives for the Fed. Courts of Ap-
peals, Working Papers 72-91 (1998)).
5 Articles on the early years of the court, such as Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit, supra
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lar district courts continues, forum shopping at the appellate level
6has largely ended. Lively debate among the judges of the court,
as well as a recent surge in review by the Supreme Court, has
compensated for the lack of percolation among circuit courts on
patent law problems.7 Most important, the court has very clearly
used its special position to focus considerable thought on key pat-
ent law issues, such as standards of obviousness and claim inter-
pretation.8 The Federal Circuit has, rightly, become a template for
nations around the globe.9 Indeed, as docket congestion has con-
tinued to grow within the federal system, the successes of the Fed-
eral Circuit have attracted considerable new interest in specializa-
tion. °
note 1, at 25-26, and Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803 (1988), focused on the court's treatment of
obviousness. Those cases, which essentially lowered the standard for obtaining a patent, can be
regarded as pro-patentee. So, too, can cases like State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin.
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), which expand the subject matter that can be pro-
tected. However, the court's recent focus on infringement can be classified as anti-patentee
because these cases decrease patent value by narrowing the scope of what is considered infring-
ing or by increasing the risk that the patent will be invalidated as overly broad. See, e.g., Rus-
sell B. Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the Federal Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing Plain Mean-
ing in Patent Claim Interpretation, 42 IDEA 1 (2002); Cindy I. Liu, Gentry Gallery, Inc. v.
Berkline Corp., 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 123 (1999).
6 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 937 (2001). As explained further below, post-Holmes,
new opportunities for appellate forum shopping have now appeared, but the practice has not had
time to develop as of this writing.
7 In the Federal Circuit's first five years of operation, the Supreme Court reviewed only
two Federal Circuit patent cases, both on procedural grounds: Christianson v. Colt Indus. Oper-
ating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988) (jurisdiction); and Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475
U.S. 809 (1986) (deference owed district court fact finding). In the last six years, the Court has
reviewed eight cases, half on purely substantive issues of patent law: Holmes Group, Inc. v.
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002) (jurisdiction); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (prosecution history estoppel); J.E.M. AG
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (patentability of plants); Nelson
v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000) (adding third parties for purposes of imposing fee
liability); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999) (immunity of states from monetary liability for patent infringement); Dickinson v.
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (deference to Patent and Trademark Office decisionmaking); Pfaff
v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (on-sale bar); Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (doctrine of equivalents). See generally John F. Duffy,
The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 Sup. CT.
REV. 273.
8 See generally Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387 (2001) (elaborating on the Federal Circuit's influence in changes in
the Supreme Court's approach).
9 For example, the European Union's proposal for a community-wide patent would create
a specialized tribunal to hear patent disputes. See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the
Community Patent, 2000 O.J. (C 337) 278, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/
cgi/sga.doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&typedoc=COMfinal&andoc=2000
&nudoc=412.
10 See, e.g., COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF AP-
PEALS, FINAL REPORT (1998) (discussing in section 5 the possibility of bankruptcy, tax, and
social security specialization); Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Statu-
2004]
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At the same time, however, some practitioners and many aca-
demics have voiced concern about the court's methodology and
jurisprudence. It has been said" that the court has been slow to
look at the ramifications of its decisions (particularly the effects of
its on-going "debates") on the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO"), the lower courts, and the consumers of its law; that it has
been less interested than other courts in considering the academic
literature or incorporating the lessons of social science research
into its decisionmaking; and that it has veered in other ways from
standard judicial practice. Because the establishment of this court
was something of an experiment, and because the court is itself so
dedicated to making the experiment work, it is worth examining
what the court is doing in order to consider institutional changes
that might further minimize the costs and maximize the benefits of
specialization. The first part of this essay sketches some of the
continuing problems perceived in the court's administration; the
second explores six avenues for improving the court's perform-
ance.
I. COURT ADMINISTRATION
Unfortunately, it is difficult to test the concerns that have
been voiced about the court empirically, and few have tried.1
2
tory and Constitutional Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952, 963-65 (2003) (discussing the
relation of specialization to statutory constmction).
11 Albeit, rarely for attribution: my observations are largely based on informal discussions
with patent practitioners and academics, including some of those who testified before the Na-
tional Academy of Science's Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-
Based Economy, on which I served, and at the Federal Trade Commission's Hearings on Com-
petition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, in which I
participated. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003).
12 This is not a problem unique to federal patent law-there are few empirical studies of
the courts generally. See generally JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS:
THE IMPACT OF COURT ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS (2002). As to the Federal Circuit, there are actually several significant
exceptions. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the
United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77 (2002) [hereinafter Allison & Lemley, The
Growing Complexity]; John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in
Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745 (2000); Ronald B. Coolley, What the Federal
Circuit Has Done and How Often: Statistical Study of the CAFC Patent Decisions 1982-1988,
71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 385 (1989); Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look
at the Federal Circuit's Patent Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CiR. B.J. 151 (1995); Kimberly A.
Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 365 (2000); Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of
Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 HOUSTON L. REV. 667 (2002)
[hereinafter Nard, The Role of Scholarship]; Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003). For other
studies of Federal Circuit decisionmaking, see Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit, supra note 1;
Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 1; Merges, supra note 5; Craig Allen Nard, A
Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. I.L. & TECH. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Nard, A Theory of
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However, there are data that suggest that the court is grappling
with a variety of problems, some of its own making and some of
institutional design. The following five issues are among the cri-
tiques most often voiced.
A. Output
One concern is that the Federal Circuit is failing to articulate
the law at the appropriate level of detail, thereby leaving those
who rely on it with insufficient guidance. 13 This critique is gener-
ally expressed as dissatisfaction with the number of nonpreceden-
tial opinions that the court issues. These are decisions that do not,
in the court's view, add "significantly to the body of law." Ac-
cordingly, the court designates them as non-citable authority; any-
one who makes business decisions based on the law articulated in
these opinions does so at her peril.1 4 And although the court's lo-
cal rule on nonprecedential opinions allows parties to petition the
court to change the "nonprecedential" designation, the court has
apparently been reluctant to do so, even when other authority on
the precise point at issue cannot be found. 15
Determining the number of nonprecedential opinions in each
circuit turns out to be difficult, as it is not apparent that courts re-
lease these figures or that statistics on this matter are kept by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.1 6 The comput-
erized databases contain "unreported" decisions, but it is not clear
what percent of such decisions are included. In the mid-1990s,
Claim Interpretation].
13 Cf Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 280 (1985) (arguing that the existence of a wide body of nuanced cor-
porate law is important to corporations when deciding where to incorporate).
14 FED. CR. R. 47.6.
15 See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 4, at 58. There are other critiques that can be leveled at
nonprecedential opinions. For example, in a decision that was later overturned, Judge Arnold
expressed the view that as a constitutional matter, all opinions should be open to citation in later
cases. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing between
publication and the precedential nature of opinions), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.
2000) (en banc). But that is a different point from the one made here, which is that taking par-
ticular decisions "off the table" reduces the guidance that the law can provide.
It should also be noted that these problems are being debated in the federal judiciary gen-
erally. Indeed, the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure is considering an amendment to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to allow citation
of dispositions designated "not for publication" or "nonprecedential." Comments Sought in
Proposed Changes to Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, U.S.L.W. LEGAL NEWs 2103,
2104 (Aug. 26, 2003) (discussing proposed FED. R. App. P. 32.1). However, these problems
appear to be particularly salient in the Federal Circuit. Kenneth R. Adamo et al., Survey of the
Federal Circuit's Patent Law Decisions in 2000: Y2K in Review, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1435,
1476-77 (2001).
16 Cohen has data on cases terminated without published opinions, but does not include
data on the Federal Circuit. COHEN, supra note 12, at 76-79.
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however, William Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael Solimine
conducted a statistical study on the way that federal judges utilize
one another's opinions.' 7 The study, which looked at the judicial
opinions of experienced federal judges who were sitting on the
courts of appeals during a specified period in the 1990s, was not
designed to examine the Federal Circuit or to compare it to the re-
gional circuits. Accordingly, the authors did not attempt to ac-
count for the differences between the complexity or size of the
Federal Circuit's docket and those of the regional courts of ap-
peals. Nor did they adjust for the comparative inexperience of the
Federal Circuit as an institution. Nonetheless, the findings provide
something of a window on how the court operates, relative to the
other federal appellate tribunals. The data can be read to support
the critique on nonprecedential opinions:
Average number of signed opinions per judge per year = 26.28
In the Federal Circuit = 11.55
Next lowest, Sixth Circuit = 19.4418
Of course, the number of signed opinions and the number of
precedential opinions are not the same: a nonprecedential opinion
can be signed and a signed opinion can be nonprecedential. 19
More important, even unsigned opinions provide guidance to those
who need to know the law. 20  Nonetheless, signing is a proxy
measure for the significance the judges attribute to the decision in
question. As such, the difference between the practice of the
judges of the Federal Circuit and the other courts is surprising on
several grounds. The regional circuits hear many diversity cases.
On the whole, these cases are less likely to be perceived as signifi-
cant because state law is applied in a context in which it is largely
non-binding. In contrast, the Federal Circuit's docket consists en-
tirely of federal cases, often in areas where it is the only court ap-
plying and creating law. Thus, all of its cases are of potential sig-
nificance. In addition, the relative youth of the Federal Circuit
means that there are likely to be issues (in patent law as well as in
17 William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of
Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998).
18 Id. at 278; see also Adamo et al., supra note 15 at 1475 ("In 2000, the Federal Circuit
decided several hundred appeals dealing with issues of patent law; of that number, the court
issued-by our count-only ninety-two published, 'precedential' patent or patent-related opin-
ions.").
19 See, e.g., Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904; see also FED. CR. R. 36 & 47.6.
20 Similarly, the court has been criticized for summary affirmances, but these also provide
guidance because they adopt the decision below. Thus, Federal Circuit Rule 36 allows the court
to enter such a judgment if, among other things, it determines that "the judgment... of the trial
court ... is based on findings that are not clearly erroneous" or "the evidence supporting the
jury's verdict is sufficient," or the "decision has been entered without an error of law."
[Vol. 54:3
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other areas of its docket) that the court is addressing for the first
time, or where it has had few opportunities to fully flesh out its
thinking. In these areas, the need for precedential authority is
greater than it is in the case of courts that are long established.
Admittedly, there are certain sets of cases on the court's
docket that involve relatively simple applications of known law to
new facts: government employment cases may fall into this cate-
gory. However, the patent part of the docket is, by many meas-
ures, extremely complex, 21 which makes it likely that a large num-
ber of decisionmaking opportunities are needed to fully express the
court's views. 2 Thus, whatever discount might be applied to the
gap between the Federal Circuit and other courts' opinions by rea-
son of the simplicity of some of the Federal Circuit's cases is off-
set by the complexity of its patent cases.
B. Internal Consistency
To develop good case law, it is helpful for judges to have an
opportunity to see how different approaches operate in practice
and to debate with their colleagues about which approach works
best. If the Federal Circuit is to obtain these advantages in the
specialty portion of its docket, then the debate would largely be
among the panels of the court, rather than with the regional cir-
cuits. Accordingly, some level of inconsistency in outcomes
should be tolerated: the issue is how much is appropriate. Some
critics think that there is currently too much. Thus, the Federal
Circuit has been criticized for construing the same patent differ-
ently in successive cases.23 The larger problem, however, is the
21 On the complexity of patent cases, see Moore, supra note 6, at 933 (finding patent cases
more complex than other civil litigation); The Nat'l Acads. Comm. on Intellectual Prop. Rights
in a Knowledge-Based Economy, Conference on the Operation of the Patent System: Insights
from New Research 292 (Oct. 22, 2001) (comments of Judge T.S. Ellis 111, Eastern District of
Virginia) (reporting that the Administrative Office of the Courts considers patent cases 1.7 times
more complex than the average civil case and commenting that "the NEC-Hyndai [sic] case
involved 25 transistor circuitry patents, and I can tell you it's far more than 1.7. It may be
100.7, because it's very labor intensive"), available at http:llwww7.nationalacademies.orglstep/
transcript1022_PDF.pdf; cf Allison & Lemley, The Growing Complexity, supra note 12, at 79.
(finding that patents have become increasingly complex by comparing a sample of patents from
the 1970s with patents from the 1990s).
22 Matters could get worse. Currently, the decision to make an opinion nonprecedential
must be by the unanimous consent of the panel; the court has considered allowing a majority to
make the decision (but giving the dissent a veto). Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
Proposal of Jan. 23, 2002, formerly available at http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/fedcir.pdf (on file
with author).
23 Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 19-20 (2001) (citing as an example the patent in CVIIBETA Ventures,
Inc. v. Tura LP, 120 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also Tobias, supra note 4, at 58 (noting
that practitioners complain they have difficulty "discerning circuit law due to conflicting prece-
dents"); Janis, supra note 8, at 403-04.
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court's failure to agree on core policy, even after a period of ex-
perimentation, and even when cases have been the subject of en
banc review.
24
The Landes, Lessig, and Solimine study supports the notion
that there is a problem here. The authors calculated how often
each judge is cited by other judges within his or her own circuit:
Average internal citation per judge per year = 122.7
In the Federal Circuit = 44.8
Next lowest, Fourth Circuit = 54.6525
The paucity of internal citations is more than merely a basis for
believing that earlier decisions are not followed; it also gives rea-
son to surmise that the judges are not, in fact, engaged in deliber-
ate experiments with differing approaches.26 Indeed, because the
citation rate does not reflect the way the court uses precedent,
these numbers may understate the extent of the problem. Citing
precedent and discussing whether it is being followed does not
necessarily mean that productive discussions on underlying policy
conflicts are taking place.
In fact, an examination of the way the court handles open
questions lends support to the concern that the court is not making
fruitful attempts to achieve consensus. Examples abound, and in-
clude the way the court is handling the controversy over the role of
secret art in nonobviousness determinations, 27 its position on
24 See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(offering several different theories on how remedies should be considered). Another example is
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
which was decided en banc after the Supreme Court had explicitly told the Federal Circuit, in
Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 (1997), to devise limits
on the doctrine of equivalents. Warner-Jenkinson was itself a review of a fractured decision of
the Federal Circuit sitting en banc. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warer-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62
F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Festo led to another round of Supreme Court review, followed by
remand. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
There were also three separate opinions on remand. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
2 Landes et al., supra note 17, at 277-78.
26 It is conceivable that the Federal Circuit resolves conflicts through the en banc process
at a rate that is higher than that of other courts. However, it is difficult to document that hy-
pothesis. Although the Administrative Office publishes statistics on the en banc resolutions of
the regional circuits and the D.C. Circuit, comparable statistics for the Federal Circuit are not
available. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2003,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbls. S-1 & B-8 (2004), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
27 See, e.g., Oddzon Prods. Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing
Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 78 F.3d 540 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Kimberly-Clark
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc.
v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983). These cases state the rules on the use of secret
art in nonobviousness determinations, but do not focus on the policy issues, which include
whether trade secrecy law should be viewed as an alternative to patents (in which case secret art
[Vol. 54:3
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whether a non-novel process can be considered patentable if the
starting or ending materials are new, 28 and the debate over whether
an unrecognized, but inherent, feature of prior art can be used to
reject a patent on novelty grounds or to statutorily bar its issuance.
To take the last issue as an illustration, consider Schering
Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, which held that ordinary artisan
recognition of the inherent feature is not required in order to pro-
duce anticipation. 29  That opinion is lavish in its recitation of
precedent; however, the court never focused on the underlying
policies. In fact, the dueling approaches under consideration in
Schering lead to important differences in the administration of the
innovation system: a recognition requirement preserves incentives
to study known inventions and to find valuable new features,31
while a nonrecognition approach protects first comers, the public,
and the temporal limits of patents.32 Discussing these policies and
outcomes would be considerably more helpful than citations of
should be invalidating to protect the trade secrecy holder), or whether trade secrecy holders
should be made to bear the risk that patents will issue on their inventions (in order to promote
utilization of the patent system). See also Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054,
1061 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Newman, J., dissenting). Failure to grapple with the policies underlying
use of secret art is of particular concern to the computer industry, where the choice between
trade secrecy and patent protection is quite viable. To be sure, the Oddzon court relied on a
change Congress made in 35 U.S.C. § 103 (now § 103(c)) (2000), but that change was not pre-
ceded by a debate over the issue, nor can it be read as endorsing one policy or another.
28 In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing In re Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d 823
(Fed. Cir. 1990)); In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289
(C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Kuehl, 475 F.2d 658 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Albertson, 332 F.2d 379
(C.C.P.A. 1964); In re Larsen, 292 F.2d 531 (C.C.P.A. 1961). These cases state rules on the
patentability of processes and also discuss the pros and cons of per se rules. However, they do
not focus on the role that process patents play in particular industries, which was at the heart of
another § 103 amendment (now 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000)), which, interestingly, was not dis-
cussed in Ochiai.
29 Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
30 Among other cases, the court cited Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ.
& Research, 304 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2002), later vacated, redecided, then heard en banc and
decided on enablement grounds, 346 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc); In re Cruciferous
Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, LLC, 269 F.3d
1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Mehl/Biophile Int'l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Continental
Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991); and Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient,
Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 339 F.3d at 1377. En banc review of Schering was
recently denied over a dissent by Judge Newman noting the factual differences between the case
and the cited precedents, and a dissent by Judge Lourie pointing out the importance of clarifying
the law on the patentability of metabolites. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 348 F.3d
992, 993-96 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
31 Under the facts of Schering, for example, a recognition requirement would spur re-
search on the metabolites of known bioactive compounds.
32 For example, invalidation of the patent in Schering prevented the patentee from string-
ing together patent rights in drugs and their metabolites; had the patentee been allowed to pro-
ceed with that strategy, it might have been able to sue generic manufacturers of unpatented
drugs on a contributory infringement theory whenever a purchaser's ingestion of the unpatented
pharmaceutical metabolized into a protected product.
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precedent or a formalistic debate over how the language in a par-
ticular precedent should be construed. Failure to identify the real
issues makes it impossible to achieve a stable consensus or to
search for ways to protect all the policy interests at stake. And
while Professor Duffy is surely right that litigants will always try
to "delve down into further and further levels" of doctrine, a
clearer elucidation of policy would provide guidance on how the
cases they frame should be decided.33
C. External Consistency
Another potential problem with channeling a particular set of
cases to a specialized tribunal is that the law in the chosen area
may fall out of step with general jurisprudential developments.
The example most often cited on this issue is the court's handling
of antitrust issues. Consider In re Independent Service Organiza-
tions Antitrust Litigation,34 which involved Xerox's refusal to sell
parts or manuals to organizations that serviced its copiers, thereby
retaining control over the after-market in maintaining its products.
The Federal Circuit rejected an antitrust challenge to Xerox's re-
fusal to deal, reasoning that because the parts were patented and
the manuals were copyrighted, Xerox had the right to refrain from
selling them. Although the opinion acknowledged a two-year-old
Ninth Circuit decision involving similar facts but going the other
way,35 the Federal Circuit distinguished that case on rather ques-
tionable grounds and largely ignored the problem the Ninth Circuit
was grappling with-namely, the anticompetitive possibilities that
patent rights present.36
The Landes, Lessig, and Solimine statistics do not analyze the
substance of decisions, but their data also suggest the possibility
that the Federal Circuit is not keeping abreast (or-more accu-
33 John F. Duffy, Comment, Experiments After the Federal Circuit, 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 803, 806 (2004). For example, perhaps the use of an unrecognized feature should depend
on whether the patentee also holds or held rights in the prior art, or whether the prior art was
patented. Unless the policies underlying the decision are articulated, it is impossible to know
whether these-or other-factors should matter. Thus, while it has been suggested that formal-
ism creates bright line rules that are easy for lower courts to apply, the focus on language to the
exclusion of policy considerations does nothing of the sort. See John R. Thomas, Formalism at
the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 771 (2003).
- 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
35 Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 136 F.3d 1354 (9th Cir. 1998) (al-
lowing antitrust plaintiffs to overcome a presumption in favor of a patentee's right to refuse to
deal with evidence that the refusal is a pretext to mask anticompetitive conduct).
36 The Federal Circuit maintained that the parts in the Ninth Circuit case were not pat-
ented, but it is not apparent that this was, in fact, the case. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Chal-
lenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 921-23 (2001); Rai, supra note 12, at 1106-10.
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rately-may not be viewed as keeping abreast) of the law in other
circuits. Its opinions are not often cited by the judges of other
benches:
Average external citation per judge per year = 70.73
In the Federal Circuit = 6.6
Next lowest, Sixth Circuit = 53.7937
Of course, the failure of other courts to be influenced by Fed-
eral Circuit law is partly attributable to the fact that many of the
cases that the Federal Circuit decides have no counterparts in other
courts. As a result, non-Federal Circuit judges have fewer oppor-
tunities to cite Federal Circuit opinions than the opinions of other
regional circuits. However, there are areas where the Federal Cir-
cuit shares responsibility with other courts, and thus places where
cross-citation could be occurring. Examples include: trademark
cases (the Federal Circuit reviews decisions by the PTO; the other
circuits review district court decisions), contract disputes (the Fed-
eral Circuit handles government contracts; the other circuits hear
contract cases between diverse parties), government tort cases (the
Federal Circuit splits authority over cases brought against the
United States with the regional circuits), labor disputes (the Fed-
eral Circuit hears cases involving federal workers; other courts
hear cases under certain federal labor laws), and, as illustrated
above, antitrust cases (the Federal Circuit hears some claims aris-
ing out of patent practices; other courts hear claims arising in other
contexts and a few cases involving patents, depending on how the
dispute is framed).
The Federal Circuit also faces many of the same procedural
problems as do the other circuits (e.g., decisions about choice of
law, jurisdiction, and availability of interlocutory review). More-
over, there are many legal and jurisprudential concerns that tran-
37 Landes et al., supra note 17, at 277-78. The authors also include calculations of each
judge's overall influence. Id. at 317-18. On their count, individual Federal Circuit judges are
among the least influential of all federal judges.
It is, of course, possible that there are fewer citations per judge in the Federal Circuit be-
cause each judge has fewer cases or publishes fewer opinions. The first explanation is not borne
out by recent statistics, which show the Federal Circuit's total terminations after oral hearings to
be in the middle of the range of the circuit courts. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDI-
CIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2003, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbls. S-1 & B-8
(2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
There may, however, be a time lag between the data available now and the time period these
authors were studying. Moreover, Congress uses its power to create judgeships to keep the
workload of each judge fairly constant. Congressional failure to confirm appointments leaves
vacancies that counter that effect, but the order-of-magnitude difference here is unlikely to be
fully explicable on such a theory. It may be that the court is simply issuing fewer opinions, but
that too is a problem. See supra Part I.A.
2004]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
scend specific fields, such as questions of how to interpret lan-
guage (e.g., the plain meaning rule, the parol evidence rule, and
use of legislative history); the role of courts (e.g., the validity of
judicial activism and the fidelity to legislative intent); and the
relevance of economic and other social science data to the resolu-
tion of legal problems. It is worth noting that the Landes, Lessig,
and Solimine study shows the D.C. Circuit judges as having con-
siderable influence on other judges, despite the specialized nature
of that court's jurisdiction. 38
D. Consideration of Extra-judicial Materials
Since the early twentieth century and the introduction of the
so-called Brandeis brief,39 there has been a marked trend for courts
to rely on more than formalistic, doctrinal case law analysis, and
rather to include in their thinking the insights provided by extra-
legal materials such as empirical, social science evidence.40
Whether this move is appropriate is beyond the scope of this
study;41 what is said is that the Federal Circuit appears wed to a
legalistic model of adjudication that is out of step with the ap-
proaches being taken by other appellate courts.
Landes, Lessig, and Solimine do not deal with the issue of ex-
ternal influences on judicial activity, and an accurate study of this
issue would be difficult, as it would require the identification of a
series of topics in which outside materials are particularly relevant,
a search for all of the appellate cases decided in these areas, a
38 Landes et al., supra note 17, at 278. The fact that studies of the federal courts generally
do not always include the Federal Circuit may contribute to its isolation, in the sense that direct
comparisons between its practices and those of the regional circuits are not routinely made. See,
e.g., COHEN, supra note 12 (including very tittle discussion of the Federal Circuit and no statis-
tics in his tables).
39 See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
40 See generally THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT,
LAW, AND CULTURE (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998); Matthew A. Edwards, Posner's Pragmatism
and Payton Home Arrests, 77 WASH. L. REV. 299, 310-11 (2002); Daniel A. Farber, Reinvent-
ing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163 (1995);
Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1569 (1990); Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996).
41 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Un-
fortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 255-64 (1997); Joseph D. Kear-
ney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 743, 775-76 (2000) (noting the disjuncture between Supreme Court Rules, which
assume that cases will be decided on a formal model of strict adherence to facts and precedent,
and the manner in which the justices of the Court in fact reason).
42 At least one judge on the court has expressed some of the same concern. See, e.g.,
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 638-39 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (Newman, J., dissenting), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1531-32 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., concurring),
rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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careful reading of the briefs and opinions in these cases, a com-
parison of the arguments presented as well as the approaches the
courts considered, and then an assessment of the comparative in-
fluence that academic literature has had on the outcomes and the
holdings of the cases in each circuit. However, Craig Nard's re-
cent study comes close.43 He reviewed every opinion of the Fed-
eral Circuit from 1983 to 2000 and counted the number of opin-
ions, and number of patent opinions, citing secondary sources, and
then compared these results to the secondary-source citation prac-
tice of the Second and Ninth Circuits in trademark and copyright
cases (which Nard viewed as comparable to the patent cases in the
Federal Circuit). He found support for the critique, finding that
the regional circuits cite scholarship roughly four times as often as
the Federal Circuit. an Although Nard points out that it may be that
the Federal Circuit is more familiar with patent law than the other
circuits are with copyright and trademark law, he also suggests that
the disparity is such that "the court verges on the abstract by fail-
ing to give adequate weight to empirical and economic scholar-
ship., 45 There are no comparable studies to support Nard's work;
however, anecdotal evidence points in a similar direction.
46
Even those who do not espouse legal pragmatism may find
reason to worry about the Federal Circuit's refusal to consider ex-
tra-legal materials. Thus, it is argued that the court's insulation
leads it to deal inappropriately with the scientific and technologi-
cal facts that Congress meant to be incorporated into the legal
standards the court administers. The examples most often cited in
this regard are (not surprisingly) drawn from the court's jurispru-
dence in emerging fields, such as biotechnology and computer
software. To take the former, the arguments are, first, that the
court appears to have seriously misjudged the level of ordinary
skill in the art. Because that level of skill determines whether an
43 Nard, The Role of Scholarship, supra note 12.
4 Id. at 678-83.
41 Id. at 685.
4 An interchange in the decision whether to rehear Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.
en banc is especially suggestive. Judge Lourie, responding to Judge Rader's citation of several
articles critical of the court's treatment of the written description requirement stated: "While
views of knowledgeable and objective commentators are surely of interest to this court, we
should not interpret the law based on taking polls of discontented writers. Our commission is to
apply the law to the facts and attempt to explain the reasons for our decisions." Enzo Biochem,
Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2002). A court that regards scholarly out-
put as equivalent to an opinion poll is unlikely to be learning from it in any useful way. At the
American Bar Association's Section of Intellectual Property Law and Young Lawyer's Commit-
tee, Judge Lourie reemphasized this point, stating that lawyers should "[alvoid emphasis on
policy and legislative history.. . . 'Such arguments telegraph to us that you'll probably lose on
the law."' Judge Lourie Provides Tips for Patent Appeals to Federal Circuit, 67 Pat., Trade-
mark & Copyright J. (BNA) at 501 (Apr. 2, 2004).
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innovation is inventive enough to patent, the result of the court's
failure to track developments in biotechnology is that these patents
are too easy to procure: information that is essentially in the public
domain becomes subject to proprietary rights. 47 Second, commen-
tators suggest that the court has failed to appreciate the difference
between genetic materials and ordinary chemical products, with
the result that when it considers issues of infringement and patent
scope, it looks to structure rather than informational content, lead-
ing to patents that are too narrow to be of commercial value.48
The critique of those who espouse legal pragmatism is more
fundamental. These critics argue that the court's insulation results
in a failure to properly consider the interaction between the rules
the court articulates and innovation policy. Consider again the
approach the court is taking to biotechnology. In fact, it narrows
patents in two ways: as noted before, ignoring informational con-
tent reduces the scope of the patent to the molecular structure de-
scribed. Second, understating the level of skill in the art affects
the extent to which a disclosure is considered to enable and de-
scribe a broad range of practices. But despite the systematic effect
of the court's interpretation of the law on patent scope, the court
never considers the effect of this construction on the biotechnology
industry. It does not, for example, look at whether narrow patents
are providing enough of a return to fulfill the goal of encouraging
progress, whether the narrowness is appropriately allocating rights
as between inventors and followers on, or whether the narrowness
is creating patent thickets that increase the cost of working in the
field. These are all issues that are being heavily investigated by
legal and economic theorists, yet the court does not cite the litera-
ture these scholars have generated.49
47 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691, 733 (2004) (noting that "the current Federal Circuit jurisprudence
lowers the obviousness barrier for biotechnology"); Joseph P. Meara, Just Who Is the Person
Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law's Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267,
283 (2002) (observing that "commentary predating the Federal Circuit noted a tendency in the
courts to equate technological complexity with nonobviousness and simplicity with obvious-
ness"); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 877, 887-88 (2002) ("Indeed, to the extent that the Federal Circuit gives particular
facts-for example, the level of the ordinary skill in art at a particular point in time-
precedential, or 'law-like' value, it commits the serious error of assuming skill in the art is
static."). But see Lawrence M. Sung, On Treating Past as Prologue, 2001 J. L. TECH. & POL'Y
75, 78-79 (2001) (arguing that the lag comes from the court's focus on the level of skill at the
time of invention).
48 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 47, at 691; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-examining the
Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783, 785 (2000)
("The DNA sequences identified by high-throughput sequencing look less like new chemical
entities than they do like new scientific information.").
49 For example, an important article on the relationship between pioneer inventors and
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The court's checkered career with the doctrine of equivalents,
which expands the literal scope of the patent, furnishes another
example of this problem. The Federal Circuit launched its attack
with the charge that patent attorneys were making "the doctrine of
equivalents ... simply the second prong of every infringement
charge.,50  The suspicion that lawyers were abusing the system led
the court to adopt a rather ungenerous view of the doctrine.51 That
interpretation severely limited the breadth of patent claims, and
ultimately led to two rounds of remand by the Supreme Court.52
Had the Federal Circuit considered the accelerating pace of tech-
nological innovation-an issue richly studied in the economic lit-
erature53-then it might have viewed reliance on the doctrine more
benignly, as an attempt to deal with the abundance of after-arising
technology and the ease with which this technology can now be
used to replace elements of the invention as literally claimed in the
patent. Moreover, the court failed to draw on empirical evidence
demonstrating that thickets of narrow patents raise transaction
costs and give rise to other innovation-deadening problems.54
those who follow on has been cited by the Federal Circuit only twice, both times by the same
judge and neither time in a majority opinion. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 640 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J., dissenting), vacated by
535 U.S. 722 (2002); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warer-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512,
1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., concurring), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Robert P. Merges &
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839
(1990); see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (providing a theoretical frame-
work for considering the patent thicket problem, but has never been cited by the Federal Cir-
cuit).
10 London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
51 Admittedly, the court was also concerned about the uncertainty that the doctrine of
equivalents engenders, but even here there is a problem as the court has made little attempt to
find studies that quantify the effect of uncertainty or compare it to the costs of restricting patent
scope. See, e.g., Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(simply citing uncertainty as the problem with the doctrine of equivalents).
52 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 (2002);
Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
53 See, e.g., Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21
RAND J. ECON. 106 (1990); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial
Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987); Edwin
Mansfield, R&D and Innovation: Some Empirical Findings, in R&D, PATENTS, AND PRODUC-
Tivrry 127, 127- 54 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984); Ted O'Donoghue et al., Patent Breadth, Patent
Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress, 7 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1 (1998).
54 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research
Tools: Is This Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 223 (Rochelle Dreyfuss
et al. eds., 2001) (discussing technology transfer problems in the biotechnology area); Bronwyn
H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of
Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 102 (2001)
(discussing the increase in semiconductor-related patents since the early 1980s). See generally
Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Set-
ting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffee et al. eds., 2001) (dis-
cussing the problems of overlapping patent rights in highly technical industries).
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E. Process
Strong arguments have been made that various review proce-
dures in the Federal Circuit are interfering with the efficiency of
adjudication, affecting outcomes, and possibly even influencing
the substance of decisional law. In part, this is a problem of the
Supreme Court's making: on the one hand, it has required defer-
ence to the decisionmaking of other institutional actors, such as the
PTO's findings on patentability and factual determinations of the
district courts.55 On the other hand, it has agreed with the Federal
Circuit that there are circumstances when careful scrutiny is re-
quired to further the legislative objective of bringing uniformity to
patent law.56
Walking the fine line between deference and scrutiny is not
easy. One of the Federal Circuit's ways of handling this challenge
is to pay close attention to the kind of evidence fact finders use.
For example, when deciding whether an invention is creative
enough to qualify for patent protection,57 the Federal Circuit has
required district courts to examine secondary considerations, such
as long-felt need for the invention and its success in the market-
place; it requires the PTO to rely almost entirely on documentary
evidence.58 Another tack the court has taken (with the Supreme
Another example is the court's recent decision to abolish the ability of academic research-
ers to rely on an experimental use defense to patent infringement, which it did without consider-
ing the impact of its decision on education or scientific research, without a discussion of
whether academia was sufficiently like commercial institutions to merit identical treatment, and
without regard to changes that the court itself made in the susceptibility of scientific principles
to patent protection. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding
that a party's non-profit status is not sufficient to entitle it to the experimental use defense);
Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring)
(arguing that "the Supreme Court's recent reiteration that infringement does not depend on the
intent underlying the allegedly infringing conduct ... precludes any experimental use defense").
For contrast, see Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court's elimination of the common law research
exception "is ill-suited to today's research-founded, technology-based economy").
55 See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (holding that the Federal Circuit's
strict review standards of PTO findings did not give enough deference to agency factual find-
ings); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986) (requiring deference to district
court findings on obviousness).
56 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390-91 (1996) (holding that
claim interpretation is an issue for the judge, not the jury). Admittedly, the Markman decision
was motivated by the Court's desire to take interpretive authority away from the jury. See, e.g.,
Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: the Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh Amend-
ment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183 (2000) (delineating the changes in Seventh
Amendment constraints post-Markman). But motive is irrelevant: by diverting claim interpreta-
tion from the jury through its classification as an issue of law, the Court gave the Federal Circuit
the power to reconsider it de novo.
57 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) (inventions that are obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the
art are not patentable).
58 See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (prohibiting examiners
from interposing their assessment of whether ordinary artisans have the tacit knowledge to
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Court's blessing) is to classify certain issues as issues of law, sub-
ject to de novo review. 59
While these actions have promoted objective decisions and
have enhanced the ease of review, they have arguably affected pat-
ent law in several adverse ways. As to the rules on the evidence
used on obviousness, it is said that tacit (that is, undocumented)
knowledge is now underutilized, while information that has little
to do with inventiveness (such as commercial success) is overval-
ued. As a result, the ordinary artisan, who is the main focus of
patent law and is presumably versed in both documented and un-
documented knowledge, can no longer be sure which inventions
will be considered patentable or accurately predict how issued
claims will be interpreted. 60 Further, it is suggested that de novo
review on such matters as claim interpretation wastes judicial re-
sources (in that district courts try infringement claims on the basis
of incorrect interpretation of the claims). Moreover, it produces
what Arti Rai calls a "domino effect" of inaccurate results (in that
the Federal Circuit decides infringement issues without the benefit
of the evidence that would have been adduced had the litigants
known the interpretation that would be given to the claims on ap-
peal).6 ' Interlocutory review might abate these problems, but the
court has been unwilling to fully utilize its authority to bypass the
final judgment rule.62 Finally, it is alleged that litigants are trying
to avoid the court's close scrutiny of district court decisions by
trying their cases to juries, a practice that increases cost and de-
lay. 63
combine references); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(requiring examination of secondary considerations). But see In re Berg, 320 F.3d 1310, 1315
(Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[E]xaminers and administrative patent judges on the Board are responsible
for making findings, informed by their scientific knowledge." (emphasis added)).
59 See, e.g., Markman, 517 U.S. 370; see also Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit, supra note
1, at 48-49 (recognizing that problems arise with complex patent law questions that often in-
volve both questions of law and fact). Some also believe that the court is still dealing with this
problem by giving insufficient deference to other fact finders. See Dethmers Mfg. Co., Inc. v.
Automatic Equip. Mfg. Co., 293 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (2002) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (arguing that
court's decision to give no deference to PTO's interpretation of regulations is at odds with the
Supreme Court's decisions regarding other agencies).
60 See, e.g., Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, supra note 12, at 7-8.
61 Rai, supra note 12, at 1059-60.
62 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1479
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., additional views) (remarking that the Federal Circuit's refusal to
grant interlocutory review of claim interpretation has created "shortfalls between expectation
and reality"). See generally Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman
and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 355 (2001) (criticizing the Federal Circuit for failing to grant
interlocutory review on issues of claim interpretation).
63 See, e.g., Ted D. Lee & Michelle Evans, The Charade: Trying a Patent Case to All
"Three" Juries, 8 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 7-8 (1999) (citing large increases injury trials of
patent cases since the creation of the Federal Circuit).
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Once again, although there is anecdotal evidence of these
problems and much off-the-record commentary (including that by
examiners and district court judges), empirical support is difficult
to find. Kimberly Moore's study of district court claim construc-
tion can, however, be read to suggest that at least some of these
comments are right. She found that district courts are reversed
more often on claim construction than on other appealable issues.
64
Her analysis further indicates that, despite the Federal Circuit's
concern that interlocutory review of claim construction would
swamp its docket, the court could readily handle the extra work-
load.
II. AVENUES FOR IMPROVEMENT
If concerns about deficiencies in specialized adjudication are
regarded as borne out (or, at least, not disproved), the next ques-
tion is remedying them (or the appearance of them).65 One issue is
causation: is the Federal Circuit's adjudicatory methodology de-
parting from that of the other courts because those who practice
before it perform differently (for example, by failing to cite rele-
vant materials or file Brandeis briefs)? Or is the court indicating
to those who practice before it that different rules are in effect
(e.g., that citing extra-judicial materials is a waste of time and
space)? If the former, then it is the bar that needs to be educated.
The court could provide that education, for example, by making
clear what the judges would like to see argued-be it positions of
other circuits or the economics literature. If the problem is in the
court itself, then institutional changes could be made that would
improve the efficiency and quality of adjudication. The following
section looks at six possibilities.
A. Jurisdiction
An obvious way to deal with many of the problems outlined
above would be to extend the jurisdiction of the court to a larger
range of issues, including issues that overlap with the authority of
other appellate courts. In fact, in recent years, the Federal Circuit
has begun to utilize exactly this approach to help it see patent law
in a wider context. Thus, the court has been entertaining appeals
on nonpatent issues, so long as a patent claim appears in at least
one litigant's pleadings. For example, the aforementioned In re
64 Moore, supra note 23, at 14-15.
65 Even if the problems are not thought to be well documented, it may be worthwhile to
consider structural changes that would minimize concerns about whether the problems exist or
not.
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Independent Services Organizations Antitrust Litigation raised
mainly antitrust issues; the court entertained it because the defen-
dant's counterclaim arose under federal patent law.66 That case not
only presented a good vehicle for examining innovation policy
more broadly, it also gave (or could have given) the Federal Cir-
cuit an opportunity to consider the views of the Ninth Circuit,
which-as noted-had confronted a fairly similar set of issues in
an earlier case.67
But despite the opportunities this practice presented for inter-
circuit dialogue, it was brought to a halt by the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Circulations
Systems, Inc.68 That case held that "arising under" in the grant of
Federal Circuit jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295 must be inter-
preted in the same way as "arising under" in the grant of federal
district court jurisdiction under § 1331. As a result, the Federal
Circuit's authority in patent disputes is now confined to cases in
which the patent issue appears on the face of the well-pleaded
complaint, or to cases where the plaintiff's right to relief depends
on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law.
Given how little the Independent Services court made of its
opportunity for dialogue with the Ninth Circuit, Holmes is quite
understandable. Nonetheless, the decision is a pity in several re-
spects. In addition to undermining opportunities for percolation
and cross-pollination, stripping antitrust cases out of the Federal
Circuit's docket increases the risk that the court will be left with a
truncated view of how federal law should be structured to promote
innovation. 69  That is, if the court fails to appreciate competition
law as a tool for encouraging invention, there is a danger that it
66 In re Indep. Servs. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This trend
began early in the court's life. See Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle
Ltd., 895 F.2d 736, 741 (Fed. Cit. 1990).
67 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that while there is a presumption that the desire to profit from intellectual prop-
erty rights is "legitimately procompetitive," this presumption is refutable by "evidence that the
monopolist acquired the protection of the intellectual property laws in an unfair manner," or by
evidence of pretext).
- 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
69 How truncated the view will be depends on several factors. First, it will depend on
whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), the compulsory counterclaim rule, is interpreted
to require a patentee who is accused of using a patent for anticompetitive purposes to assert
patent counterclaims in the action. If the patentee is required to do so, then patent disputes that
arise in the course of antitrust disputes will be heard in regional circuits; if not, patentees may
well save their claims for a separate suit, appealable to the Federal Circuit. In like manner, the
level of truncation will depend on how the courts interpret the substantiality prong of Holmes.
Finally, there is the issue of whether plaintiffs turn Holmes into an invitation to forum shop by,
for example, omitting claims for declarations of patent invalidity in situations where they may
previously have asserted them. See generally Cotropia, supra note 3, at 298-300 (discussing
forum shopping strategies).
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will act as though the nation's commitment to technological pro-
gress requires greater emphasis on patents, leading it more often to
hold patents valid and infringed. Furthermore, antitrust cases have
historically proven to be an important avenue for the introduction
of economics into decisionmaking. Whatever dynamic led other
courts to rely on this literature might have, over time, operated in a
similar manner in the Federal Circuit. If so, then the court might
have eventually generalized this use of social science to the resolu-
tion of open issues of patent law.
Of course, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurring
opinion, Holmes could also have salutary effects. It reinserts the
regional circuits into the disposition of patent disputes, which may
provide an "antidote" to the risks that specialized adjudication pre-
sents.7° Justice Stevens also noted that spreading jurisdiction over
patent-related disputes across the circuits opens the door to the
kind of conflicting decisions that signal to the Supreme Court that
there is an issue worthy of its consideration.71 Other benefits
might also be forthcoming. Thus, the perceived need for uniform-
ity in patent law could well inspire the Federal Circuit to issue
more precedential opinions so that fine distinctions in the law are
better understood by other courts. To ensure that its decisions are
followed, it may also start to back up its holdings with the kinds of
policy arguments and empirical data that the regional appellate
judges are likely to find convincing. Furthermore, the allocation
of patent issues back to the regional circuits puts these tribunals
into a position where they can contribute to procedural law on such
matters as the admissibility of evidence, the availability of inter-
locutory review, and the degree of deference owed to administra-
tive decisions. Finally, removing some of the Federal Circuit's
authority in antitrust cases allows courts with more experience in
competition policy to help design the interface between antitrust
72and patent law.
B. Choice of Law
It has been suggested that some of the problems surrounding
specialization could be dealt with through choice-of-law rules.
These would give the Federal Circuit free reign to interpret the
Patent Act. However, when the issues to be decided are not
70 535 U.S. at 839.
71 Id. at 838-39.
72 See generally Ronald S. Katz & Adam J. Safer, Should One Patent Court Be Making
Antitrust Law for the Whole Country?, 69 ANTrrRUST L.J. 687 (2002) (discussing the dispropor-
tionate amount of antitrust cases heard in the Federal Circuit and the effects on the development
of antitrust law).
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uniquely related to the administration of patent law, including es-
pecially antitrust law, then the law could be kept in the mainstream
of federal jurisprudence by binding the Federal Circuit to the law
of the circuit from which the appeal arose.7 3 Now that Holmes will
put some patent cases on the dockets of the regional circuits (and
state courts), the logical extension of this argument is that preserv-
ing uniformity in patent law requires the regional circuits to be
bound by the Federal Circuit's views on patent matters.74
Despite the appeal of such choice-of-law rules, and their ante-
cedents in early Federal Circuit jurisprudence,75 there are several
problems with this approach. From a theoretical perspective, the
entire notion of "circuit law" and "choice-of-circuit-law rules"
makes little sense. As Justice Brandeis said, "law . . . does not
exist without some definite authority behind it."'76  The authority
underlying patent law is the United States; circuit courts are not
sovereigns in the sense that they have authority to impose their
notions of law on non-hierarchically related bodies. Of course,
circuit courts do have the authority to interpret law and to develop
common law to fill interstices in legislation, but it was firmly set-
tled in early interpretations of the Evarts Act that each circuit's
decisions are made independently of the jurisprudence of the oth-
ers.
7 7
73 See, e.g., id. at 696-701 (criticizing the court's decision in Nobelpharma AB v. Implant
Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998), to apply Federal Circuit law to issues at the
patent/antitrust interface).
74 See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 309-10; see also FTC and Dept. of Justice Antitrust Div.,
Public Hearings: Competition and Intellectual Property Law in the Knowledge-Based Economy
20-34 (July 11, 2002) (statement of Robert Taylor, American Bar Association, Section of Intel-
lectual Property Law) (discussing the lack of uniformity in patent law prior to the Federal Cir-
cuit). Because of the greater attention that will now be paid to the well-pleaded complaint rule,
achieving true uniformity will also require state courts to be bound by Federal Circuit patent
law.
75 See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1437-40 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (applying the law of the circuit of origin to the non-patent issue), overruled by Nobel-
pharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Panduit Corp. v. All
States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (ruling that the
Federal Circuit will renew procedural issues not unique to patent law under the law of the circuit
of origin).
76 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting White Taxicab Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
77 See, e.g., Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 30 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir.
1929) (noting a duty to form an independent judgment and not blindly follow other circuits),
rev'd on other grounds, 280 U.S. 384 (1930). For a full discussion, see also Samuel Estreicher
& Ricky Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 736
n.275 (1989) (discussing the absence of intercircuit stare decisis). State courts do not see them-
selves as in a hierarchical relationship to federal appellate courts. See, e.g., Green v. Hendrick-
son Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784 (Ind. 2002) (asserting jurisdiction over copyright counter-
claim under Holmes but rejecting application of Seventh Circuit law to the question of whether a
contract is preempted by copyright law). See generally Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat.
826 (establishing circuit courts of appeal).
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The analogy between intercircuit conflicts and choice-of-law
analysis is incomplete in any event: if the issue in these cases was
really choice of law, then the rule of applying forum law (that is,
the district court's circuit law) would be curious. Forum law is
generally applied to procedural issues, but it is not routinely ap-
plied to substantive matters, such as substantive questions of anti-
trust law. Rather, a court would normally look to other criteria,
such as where the events (such as restraints on trade) took place,
where the parties are domiciled, or which jurisdiction has the
greatest interest in the dispute.78 To be sure, the locus of patent
infringement would have to be considered the United States as a
whole, otherwise, there would be no role for the Federal Circuit to
interpret patent law. But on other issues, such as antitrust issues,
if it were decided that national innovation policy requires a change
in settled procedure under the Evarts Act, district court forum law
should not be applied reflexively. Among other things, alterna-
tives tied to the place where primary activity took place would
permit competitors to predict the consequences of their actions
before litigation is commenced and a forum is chosen. Such ap-
proaches would also reduce incentives to forum shop.
But even if the conceptual problem with conceiving of inter-
circuit conflict as a choice-of-law issue is overcome, there are
practical reasons to reject the analogy. First, where the Federal
Circuit has used this approach, it has not found it easy to decide
when an issue is so related to patent law, its own law should ap-
ply.79 A choice-of-law analysis would, in other words, inject new
sources of uncertainty into the system. Much more important, the
benefits of the Holmes rule that are described above could not be
realized under such a system. Bound by regional circuit non-
patent law, the Federal Circuit would never be required to think
through other matters, such as antitrust issues, and thus, perhaps,
would never come to better appreciate the effects of competition
on innovation or the insights that social science might offer to law.
Bound by Federal Circuit patent law, the circuit courts would not
dissipate residual favoritism for patents. Nor would the courts en-
gage in dialogue with one another on issues of patent and other
law, or the relationships among the various legal regimes that af-
fect innovation. Furthermore, federal judges sitting on diversity
cases have never enjoyed the role of "ventriloquist's dummy;" 80 it
78 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS (1971).
79 See, e.g., Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (reversing prior practice of applying circuit law on antitrust issues).
80 Austrian v. Williams, 198 F.2d 697, 703 (2d Cir. 1952) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("But the
question arises as to why Congress conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear suits by
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is a mistake to create new situations where it is necessary for one
group of judges to decide a case based on a forecast of another
group's resolution. True, this procedure would eliminate splits
with regional circuits, but at the cost of decreasing the information
available to the Supreme Court when it entertains certiorari peti-
tions or considers the merits of patent law questions.
Besides, a middle approach is available. Jurisprudence under
the Evarts Act never prohibited a regional circuit from concluding
that a sister court had found the right result. A modest extension
of that proposition would be for each court to start with a presump-
tion that the Federal Circuit should be followed on patent issues,
and that regional law should be followed on other issues. These
presumptions could, however, be overcome, either because a court
was persuaded the presumptively applicable rule was wrong, or
because in the circumstances of the case, the issues were so inter-
twined, that using Federal Circuit law on some issues and regional
circuit law on others was inappropriate. In this way, there would
be no need to sharply and bindingly characterize particular issues
as patent-related or not. Much more important, the Federal Circuit
would have the motivation to publish enough opinions to fully ar-
ticulate its law, and to construct opinions that are persuasive to
other judges. 81  By the same token, because the regional courts
would be forced to specify reasons for rejecting Federal Circuit
precedent, effective dialogue would be encouraged.
C. Enhancing the PTO's Law-Making Authority
Some have argued that the real problem with patent law is that
the Federal Circuit is badly positioned to develop it well, and that
the Patent Office and its full-time staff of patent specialists would
be better at fashioning law resonant with industrial needs and ac-
cepted economic thinking.8 2  Channeling disputes on patentability
trustees if such courts are merely to be 'ventriloquists' dummies' for the state courts."); HENRY
J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 142 (1973) ("When the state law is
plain, the federal judge is reduced to a 'ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular
state."' (quoting Richardson v. CIR, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942))).
81 Cotropia argues that independent interpretation of patent law issues will lead to races to
the courthouse, as every potential patent defendant wishing to avoid Federal Circuit patent law
will have an incentive to file first, and force the patentee to assert compulsory patent counter-
claims. However, the number of such cases is likely to be small. Cotropia counted fewer than
ten cases reported prior to Holmes in which jurisdiction over patent claims would have shifted.
Cotropia, supra note 3, at 298. Of course, Holmes can be read as an invitation to manipulate,
but the opportunity to avoid Federal Circuit patent law is limited, as not every potential defen-
dant has a nonfrivolous suit to bring. Cotropia also argues that chaos will ensue as circuits
return to their pre-Federal Circuit case law. Id. at 301-02. Holmes did not, however, render the
prior work of the Federal Circuit a nullity.
82 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Ad-
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to the PTO would have the added benefit of eliminating jury trials
on technical questions, where lay judgments are likely to produce
inferior outcomes.
There are several ways in which the PTO's input into patent
jurisprudence could be enlarged. At the wholesale justice level,
the PTO could be given rule-making authority. Under Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and its
progeny, the PTO's articulation would then be entitled to defer-
ence. 83 At retail, a post-grant opposition procedure, which would
allow third parties to challenge patents in an inter partes proceed-
ing in the PTO, could be instituted. It would presumably lead to
decisions about the application of law to facts to which the Federal
Circuit would be required to defer.84 An alternative would be to
enhance the administrative recourse available under the current
statute.8 5 This could be accomplished by following the Ninth Cir-
cuit's lead in copyright, and developing a doctrine of primary ju-
risdiction. The doctrine would require a court-or the parties to a
dispute-to seek administrative resolution before pursuing judicial
intervention.86
Unfortunately, there are several problems with relying on the
Patent Office to cure perceived defects in Federal Circuit adjudica-
tion. The first two ideas rely on congressional action, which may
not be quickly forthcoming, given the other demands on legisla-
tors' attention. The third approach allows the court to help itself,
but the absence of congressional participation is also problematic.
The PTO finds it difficult to fulfill the demands of the current ap-
plication process expeditiously; without more funding and support
it is not likely to be able to take on new duties, and would certainly
not be able to execute them in a manner that improves on the Fed-
87
eral Circuit's performance.
ministrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 133 (2000) (arguing the PTO is supe-
rior to the courts in expertise and ability to achieve uniformity).
83 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-845 (1984)
(discussing deference to agency regulations); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944) (finding it is proper to rely on the Administrator of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
although not controlling).
84 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (finding that the Federal Circuit re-
views findings of fact by the PTO according to Administrative Procedure Act standards).
85 See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 251-252, 301-307, 311-318 (2000) (reissue, ex parte reex-
amination, and inter parties reexamination, respectively).
86 See Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Incorp., 285 F.3d 857, 863 (9th Cir.
2002) (referring questions about the validity of copyright registrations to the Register of Copy-
rights under a doctrine of primary jurisdiction), amended by 307 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2002). See
generally Duffy, supra note 82, at 136-48 (discussing application of primary jurisdiction doc-
trine to patent claim interpretation).
87 The Copyright Office has already indicated that it is not prepared to deal with the cases
that might flow out of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Syntek. See Copyright Office Signals
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More generally, the PTO has serious institutional constraints.
Until quite recently, it was not even clear that it was an agency
within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),
and therefore entitled to any form of deference. 88 Because it was
established long before the advent of the administrative state and
passage of the APA, it was not organized with a modern vision of
the role that agencies can or should play in governance. The ab-
sence of such a vision continues to be felt in its institutional cul-
ture. There are a very large number of examiners, most of whom
are not lawyers or the recipients of vigorous legal training. The
incentive structure provided is geared to helping the PTO's cli-
ents-which is to say, patent applicants. 89 The PTO's publications
give the appearance that short shrift is given to the task of protect-
ing the public domain. 90 And since it is one of the few agencies
that does not employ any economists, it is not likely to be better at
factoring social science information into its thinking. 91  Thus,
while Chevron may well have been right to decide that an expert
agency exercising duly delegated power was a better statutory in-
terpreter than a generalist court, it does not directly follow that the
Patent Office, which was not constituted to be the recipient of
delegated authority, would do a better job than an expert tribunal.
To put this another way, if Congress decided to act on this ap-
proach, it would need to dramatically restructure the Patent Office.
D. Designations
Another way to provide the Federal Circuit with a rich array
of experiences is to make greater use of designation practice.92
Unwillingness to Cancel Flawed Copyright Registrations, 63 Pat., Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) at 527 (Apr. 19, 2002) (interview with General Counsel David Carson).
88 See Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 154 (recognizing the PTO as an agency subject to the APA);
see also Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent De-
nials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 199 (2000) (noting the failure to follow the APA's requirements
of deference to agency decisionmaking).
89 See generally Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577
(1999).
90 See, e.g., U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN 2,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2 l/stratplan_- 03feb2003.pdf (last visited
Jan. 29, 2004). The plan states at the outset that "[i]t is built on the premise that American
innovators want to obtain enforceable intellectual property rights here and abroad as seamlessly
and cost-effectively as possible." Id. Nowhere does it say that innovators also need to ensure
that public science remains public. To the contrary, the recommendations are largely geared to
churning out patents more rapidly.
91 See Rai, supra note 12, at 1132-33 (citing a communication with Stephen Kunin,
USPTO Deputy Commissioner for Patent Policy). See generally id. at 1068-86 (discussing
whether the Federal Circuit should defer to the PTO).
92 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-297, 636 (2000) (provisions for assignment of judges to other
courts). On this issue, I would like to thank Jan Horbaly, Circuit Executive of the Federal Cir-
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Currently, the power to appoint and utilize visiting judges is in-
voked mainly in cases of recusal and to deal with workload imbal-
ances. 93 According to statistics of the Administrative Office, the
Federal Circuit is not currently participating in this practice to the
extent that other courts do:
Table 1
Participation in Receiving Service
Appeals in Other from
Circuits Other Circuits
# of Appeals # of Appeals
Judges disposed of Judges disposed of
1st Circuit 12 58 16 101
2nd Circuit 46 714 45 840
3rd Circuit 15 189 23 255
4th Circuit 34 246 34 253
5th Circuit 40 490 38 460
6th Circuit 56 1492 59 1626
7th Circuit 20 187 3 3
8th Circuit 51 732 39 424
9th Circuit 56 829 52 646
10th Circuit 19 145 28 222
1I th Circuit 27 312 49 739
D.C. Circuit - - 9 15
Federal Circuit 7 17 - -
Services Provided by Visiting Judges in Appeals Terminated
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2001. 94
Note that these statistics are not complete: they apparently
omit the extent to which the Federal Circuit utilizes visiting
judges. 95 To get a rough measure of its designation of judges and
to assess the court's practice over time, a Westlaw search on the
term "sitting by designation" was conducted. It provides a meas-
cuit, for his input.
93 See Shorthanded and Overworked, Courts Look to Visiting Judges for Help, 33 THE
THIRD BRANCH 7 (July 2001) (discussing the use of visiting judges to deal with recusals and
caseload issues), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/july01 ttb/july01.html (last visited Jan.
29, 2004).
94 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2001,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl. V-2 (2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov
judbus2001/appendices/v02sep01.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2004).
95 According to the Office of the Circuit Executive of the Federal Circuit, the missing data
are zeros (no visiting judges were used in the twelve months ending September 30, 2001).
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ure (albeit, a measure that is probably very inaccurate) of the num-
ber of cases each circuit decided utilizing a judge sitting by desig-
nation:
Table 2
Cases Involving a Judge Sitting
by Designation
1st Circuit 2901
2nd Circuit 3419
3rd Circuit 2247
4t Circuit 2612
5th Circuit 2293
6th Circuit 3546
7t' Circuit 3336
8th Circuit 5040
9th Circuit 5407
10t Circuit 3148
11t' Circuit 5023
D.C. Circuit 916
Federal Circuit 228
Cases Decided by a Panel Including a Judge Sitting by
Designation, 1982-Present
Again, the Federal Circuit is at the low end of the spectrum.96
Extending designation practice to deal with issues other than
recusal and workload problems is costly because it requires judges
and clerks to travel and stay in hotels. It can also be risky: fre-
quent visits could disrupt the operations of the court from which
the designated judge comes, and interfere with the collegiality of
both the bench from which the visiting judge is drawn and the
96 The Federal Circuit supplied me with information on its use of visiting judges from
1982-1999. This information can be summarized as follows:
Number of Judges Provided Judge-Days Provided to
to the Federal Circuit the Federal Circuit
District Courts 31 113
Circuit Courts 12 36
Court of International Trade 5 38
Supreme Court I I
Although the court has made some use of designation authority, it may not have had the effect
suggested in text as several of the judges appointed were drawn from another specialized court.
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court to which that judge is assigned.97 Nonetheless, it has long
been recognized that the problems of specialization are amelio-
rated when the judges on a specialized tribunal circulate to other
courts, where they hear and decide cases outside their specialty.98
Sitting on other circuit courts would help the Federal Circuit
judges stay abreast of jurisprudential trends across the country,
thereby improving the cohesiveness of federal law generally. It
would also expose them to other analytical approaches to deci-
sionmaking. Post-Holmes, it might also be helpful for the other
appellate courts to have a vehicle for becoming reacquainted with
patent law. Having judges on the Federal Circuit sit on trial courts
might also be beneficial, as it would help the court assess the im-
pact of its practices (such as its refusal to hear interlocutory ap-
peals from claim constructions) on the trial process, and on liti-
gants and jurors.99
To a somewhat lesser extent, it would also be worthwhile for
the Federal Circuit to increase its utilization of visiting judges.
The interchange would be almost as useful at acquainting the court
with practices elsewhere, and the information would be more effi-
ciently communicated. At the same time, however, the practice
might be especially disruptive. If it is true that the judges of the
Federal Circuit have greater facility with the technical materials
involved in patent disputes, then the outcome of the cases on
which a judge from another circuit participated might be compro-
mised, or viewed as compromised. If the designated judge were
from a district court, that problem is potentially exacerbated.
There is empirical evidence tending to show that visiting district
judges can be overly deferential to the appellate judges on a
panel.'l° Differences in the selection criteria and experience of
district court judges may also contribute to a sense that lower qual-
ity justice was being dispensed.101
97 See Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An Ex-
amination of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on the United States
Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351, 372-74 (1995) (arguing that District Court
judges sitting by designation may cause doctrinal inconsistencies in the Court of Appeals); see
also Maxwell L. Steams, Appellate Courts Inside and Out, 102 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=416320 (June 16, 2003).
98 See, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 169-72 (1976); see also
COHEN, supra note 12, at 191-200 (describing both the costs and benefits of specialization).
99 Only two active judges-Mayer and Rader-have experience as trial judges, and both
were on the U.S. Claims Court, which is also specialized as to both law and procedure. U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judicial Biographies, at http://www.fedcir.govl
judgbios.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2004).
10 Saphire & Solimine, supra note 97, at 375-8 1.
101 Id. at 397-98, 402. Significantly, the Judicial Conference of the United States has taken
up the issue of designations. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE
PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 98-100 (Dec. 1995) (discussing in Recommendation 62 vari-
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E. Vacancies
The Federal Circuit's perspective could also be expanded by
appointing judges familiar with innovation law more generally,
including individuals with backgrounds in antitrust litigation, eco-
nomic analysis, and economic and industrial history. Furthermore,
it might be helpful to fill some of the openings on the Federal Cir-
cuit with regional district judges. Elevation is not uncommon
within the regional circuits, but it has not been the practice at the
Federal Circuit, perhaps because the Federal Circuit is not in a spe-
cific hierarchical relationship with any of the regional trial
courts. 102  Adding one or more experienced regional trial court
judges to the Federal Circuit bench would provide the court with
greater perspective on the problems its rulings engender at trial,
and a broader sense of the law outside the fields in which it spe-
cializes. Because patent disputes are such an important part of the
Federal Circuit's docket, appointments from within the PTO (such
as from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences) should also
be considered.10 3 The opportunity for elevation would improve the
incentive structure within the PTO. 1°4 Again, it would provide the
Federal Circuit with more information on the practical impact of
its decisions.
F. Venue Rules
It can be argued that several of the Federal Circuit's problems
stem from a defect in institutional design. Capacity for expertise
was created at the appellate level, even though the technical prob-
lems that arise in patent cases generally occur in connection with
matters that can be classified as factual. Since factual findings are
ous approaches to streamlining temporary assignment of judicial authority), available at
http://www.uscourts.govlrp/CH08.PDF.
If the Federal Circuit is to use more district judges, the designation statute needs to be
clarified. Section 292 permits the chief judge of a circuit to designate "one or more district
judges within the circuit to sit upon the court of appeals .... " 28 U.S.C. § 292 (2000). How-
ever, it is unclear who is a district judge of the Federal Circuit: no one? Is it the judges of the
Court of Federal Claims and the Court of International Trade? Or, perhaps, all of the district
judges of the United States (on the theory that all of their patent cases can be appealed to the
Federal Circuit)?
102As mentioned in note 99, two active judges had trial court experience before elevation
to the Federal Circuit, but not with jury-tried cases. In addition, Judge Rader has sat by designa-
tion as a trial judge. See Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 906 F. Supp. 813
(E.D.N.Y. 1995); Ristvedt-Johnson, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. IlI. 1992).
103 Two active Federal Circuit judges--Gajarsa and Linn-have experience as patent ex-
aminers, but not as adjudicators. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judicial Biogra-
phies, at http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2004).
104 Cf Merges, supra note 89, at 606-14 (suggesting that patent quality would improve if
PTO incentives were enhanced and proposing a series of such changes).
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reviewed on a deferential standard,'05 this design potentially
wastes much of the expertise fostered by specialization. °6  The
Federal Circuit implemented a series of practices to avoid that
wastage, but they produced many of the difficulties outlined ear-
lier. Thus, the court began to engage in careful scrutiny of factual
findings, but that raised the problem of insufficient deference and
to increased use of jury trials. The court mandated reliance on cer-
tain forms of evidence, but that changed the substance of the law
for purely procedural reasons. Finally, the court classified certain
issues at the margin of fact and law as issues of law requiring de
novo review, but that created difficulties concerning the timing of
appeals.
All in all, it might have been better had Congress created an
expert trial court, whose decisions would be reviewed in a court of
general jurisdiction. That way, the facts would be found by those
with technical expertise, while the law would be developed by
generalist judges who could have kept it in the mainstream. 0 7 But
be that as it may, a case has yet to be made for abolishing the Fed-
eral Circuit and starting all over again by replacing it with a spe-
cialized trial court. Of course, a specialized trial court should be
added to the system, but dual-level specialization would take pat-
ent law even further out of the mainstream by depriving it of any
leavening by generalist judges.
Another possibility would be to utilize a variant on a strategy
proposed by Paul Carrington, Daniel Meador, and Maurice
Rosenberg in their influential study, Justice on Appeal. The au-
thors suggested that one way to avoid the problems of specializa-
tion would be to give courts of general jurisdiction special power
over particular subject areas. 0 8 The authors were thinking about
appeals, but their idea could be used to create expert patent trial
courts that do not sacrifice the potential for generalist contribu-
tions to the law. This could be accomplished by designating one
district in each circuit as the patent court. If the venue statute were
then changed to lay venue in a particular circuit (such as a circuit
where the defendant's acts of alleged infringement took place),
patent litigation would be concentrated in twelve districts, one for
105 FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a).
'06 See generally Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit, supra note 1, at 46-52 (observing that the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has more expertise than regional district courts in re-
viewing technical evidence, and the presumption in favor of the factual findings of the district
courts mandated by Rule 52(a) does not take advantage of that expertise).
107See generally Rai, supra note 12 (advocating for improved fact finding expertise
through the institution of specialized trial courts).
108 CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 98, at 172-73.
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each region of the country. These courts would continue to hear
their normal load, but they would have enough patent cases to de-
velop expertise in patent adjudication. A further suggestion would
be to have each of the designated districts choose a single judge or
small group of judges to hear patent cases. These judges could be
rotated through this assignment every five to ten years to reduce
the problems associated with their specialization.' 09
In fact, this system is not as gross a departure from the current
situation as might be supposed. Under the venue statute now in
effect, venue for patent cases is "in the district in which the defen-
dant or his agent resides or may be found."" But because federal
law also provides that for venue purposes, "a defendant that is a
corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in
which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is
commenced,""' plaintiffs have substantial flexibility in choosing
the location of their suits. Were these provisions operating to dis-
tribute patent cases around the country evenly, a typical district
court would hear no more than one case a year. 112  Surprisingly,
however, the cases are not dispersed in this way. Instead, Kim-
berly Moore's study of forum shopping shows that between 1995
and 1999:
109 Because venue would not then lie in some states, it is possible that this change would
engender challenges to the designated district courts' personal jurisdiction. But as the Moore
data indicates, patent litigants tend to be subject to jurisdiction in many locations. See infra note
112. If there is a residual problem, then Congress could change the personal jurisdiction rules to
provide for nationwide or circuitwide jurisdiction. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C) and (D).
Because patents are nationwide rights, and patent infringement a problem of national dimension,
such a change would meet constitutional standards. Cf., e.g., Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf
Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 103-110 (1987) (acknowledging congressional authority to create
nationwide service of process rules to enforce federal law).
11028 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (2000).
"'28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2000).
"
2 Moore, supra note 6, at 902 (indicating that for the 16 years from 1983-1999, 1409
cases made it to trial in the country's 94 district courts).
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[M]ost patent cases are brought in only a handful of jurisdic-
tions .... The top five district courts have 29% of all patent
cases terminated in the ninety-four district courts during this
five-year period, but onl' 15% of all civil case terminations
during the same period."
Although the reasons for this concentration are not clear, it
has, in fact, produced a significant level of expertise within the
district court system. According to Moore, these courts adjudicate
cases more quickly than other courts, they resolve disputes at an
earlier phase of the litigation, and do so at a lower cost. 14 And in
fact, there have been federal district court judges who have en-
joyed substantial reputations in patent law.' 15 Specialization by a
small community of district judges could potentially produce the
kind of collegiality and interchange with the Federal Circuit that is
conducive to improving many aspects of administering patent law.
CONCLUSION
As the production of information becomes an increasingly
prominent component of the economy, the smooth operation of a
court uniquely dedicated to the development of innovation law be-
comes essential. Over all, observers largely agree that in its
twenty years of existence, the Federal Circuit has vastly improved
the patent system. But as with all experiments, there is always
room for improvement. To a large extent, departures from main-
stream trends-whether documented or suspected-can be reme-
13 Id. at 903-04. Moore provides the following table:
District # patent cases % patent cases % civil cases Ratio patent to civil cases
1 C.D. Cal 870 9.1 4.2 2.2
2 N.D. Cal 606 6.3 2.3 2.7
3 N.D. Ill 569 5.9 3.4 1.7
4 S.D.N.Y. 394 4.1 4.1 1.0
5 D. Mass 319 3.3 1.4 2.4
6 D. Del 308 3.2 0.3 10.7
7 S.D. Fla. 302 3.1 2.5 1.2
8 E.D. Va. 288 3.0 1.7 1.8
9 D.N.J. 286 3.0 2.6 1.2
10 D. Minn. 276 2.9 1.0 2.9
Civil and Patent Caseloads from 1995-1999
Id. at 903.
14 See id. at 908-16. Moore also suggests venue changes, albeit different from the ones
suggested here. She would rewrite the venue statute to eliminate forum shopping by specifying
that the action must be brought at the domicile of the infringer. Id. at 934-36.
'sTo name just three: Judge T.S. Ellis III of the Eastern District of Virginia, Roderick
McKelvie, who just left the District of Delaware, and William C. Conner, who sat on the South-
ern District of New York.
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died by relatively straightforward changes in institutional design.
The Supreme Court's decision in Holmes represents just such a
change. It re-injects the Federal Circuit into a potentially enrich-
ing dialogue with the regional courts of appeals and, in Justice
Stevens' words, provides an "antidote" to the problematic aspects
of specialized adjudication."16 Other modifications, such as greater
use of the designation authority to keep patent law resonant with
national jurisprudential trends, can be made by the courts through
the auspices of the Judicial Conference and the Administrative Of-
fice.
Some steps, such as adding a patent trial court or modifying
the venue statute to concentrate patent litigation, would require
intervention by Congress. And even more drastic changes may be
in order. For example, it has been suggested that the role of juries
should be revised or eliminated, approaches that would possibly
require an amendment to the Constitution." 7 To make the case for
these kinds of changes, more empirical evidence is needed. Study-
ing adjudication empirically poses tremendous problems, in part
because it is difficult to scrutinize the substance of decisions ob-
jectively and in part because the raw data are not always available.
Nonetheless, there are now many talented researchers in this field.
Their work, coupled with the evidence emerging from the recent
hearings of the Federal Trade Commission and the National Acad-
emy of Sciences, will hopefully yield fresh ideas, as well as a firm
basis for the sound implementation of the nation's innovation pol-
icy.
i 16 Holmes Group, Inc. v Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839 (2002)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
117 See Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revo-
cation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 87-93 (1997) (suggesting that the
PTO be given a greater role in validity determinations so as to bypass juries). See generally
John B. Pegram, Markman and Its Implications, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 560
(1996) (proposing readings of Markman that would divert issues from the jury). Compare Pat-
rick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 43, 106-07 (1980) (arguing for a complexity exception), with Morris
S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128
U. PA. L. REV. 829, 848 (1980) (arguing against a complexity exception to the Seventh
Amendment jury trial right).
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